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Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002300050022-9

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Copy No. 56 of 105

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18 February 1969

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OSD, JCS, NSC & STATE review(s)
completed.

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-64. 6/47

SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Planning for the
Vietnam Theater

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-64. 6/47, 25 October 1968 and
Memorandum for Holders thereof, 6 December 1968
b. Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-64. 6/47,
4 November 1968
c. Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-64. 6/47,
24 December 1968
d. Memoranda for Holders of USIB-D-64. 6/47, 25X1
20 December 1968 and 23 January 1969
e. USIB-D-64. 6/43, 16 August 1968

1. The attached memorandum on the subject from the Chairman, Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) submits for Board consideration a report on actions taken in response to Mr. Rostow's request in reference e., for the development of a comprehensive plan for the use of intelligence resources to monitor enemy performance under a possible agreement calling for a total bombing halt or a general cease fire in Vietnam. In particular, General Reynolds outlines recent actions with respect to the basic study on the subject, Plan A (Bombing Halt) and Plan B (Cease Fire) as circulated by reference a., following USIB consideration thereof as recorded in references b. and c. 25X1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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2. General Reynolds indicates that the basic study. Plan A and Plan B were forwarded to the White House on 20 December 1968 by memorandum from Admiral Taylor (copy attached as Tab A). Plan B which was then tentative pending full coordination within DoD has now received that coordination and the White House has been so informed by memorandum from Mr. Helms dated 17 February 1969 (copy attached as Tab B). The Department of Defense comments, derived from the JCS review which provided certain updating of resources and corrections in some command arrangements, have been incorporated as appropriate into the Plans (reference d.).

3. General Reynolds also advises that as the study was being developed those actions which were time-sensitive were brought to the attention of appropriate authorities, and as the Plans were approved by USIB appropriate implementing actions were undertaken by CIA and other elements of the intelligence community.

4. General Reynolds recommends that, in addition to noting the fulfillment of the charge from Mr. Rostow, members of USIB take cognizance in their areas of responsibility of the USIB-developed Study and Plans in further consideration and implementation of intelligence actions related to the developing situation in Vietnam.

USIB ACTION REQUESTED

5. Board members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close of business 25 February of their concurrence in or other views on the above recommendations as contained in paragraph 4 of General Reynolds' memorandum.

Executive Secretary

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Attachment
Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-64.6/47
(CCPC-D-28/68)
18 February 1969

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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Planning for the
Vietnam Theater

REFERENCES: A. [redacted] memo from Mr. Rostow to
DCI, dated August 7, 1968, same subject
B. USIB-D-64.6/47 (CCPC-D-27/68), dated
25 October 1968
C. Memo for Holders of USIB-D-64.6/47,
4 November 1968

1. The basic study on Intelligence Contingency Planning for Vietnam, Plan A (Bombing Halt) and Plan B (Cease Fire) were forwarded to the White House on 20 December 1968 (copy of forwarding memorandum is attached as Tab A). Plan B, which was then tentative as it had not been fully coordinated within DOD, has now received that coordination and the White House has been informed (copy of forwarding memorandum is attached as Tab B).

2. The primary comment from DOD was derived from the JCS review which provided certain updating of resources and corrections in some command arrangements. These were incorporated as appropriate in the study and plans. The JCS response on Plan B included the statement that this Plan should be accepted as useful guidance for intelligence activities in the event of a cease fire and subsequent developments in Vietnam, to include T-day and post-hostilities planning.

3. During the course of the CCPC development of the study and Plans A and B, those actions which were time-sensitive were brought

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Memorandum for Holders

USIB-D-64.6/47

(CCPC-D-28/68)

18 February 1969

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to the attention of appropriate authorities. Additionally, as Plans A and B were approved by the USIB, appropriate implementing action was undertaken by CIA and it is understood by other elements of the intelligence community.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The USIB note the fulfillment of the charge from Mr. Rostow.

b. The members of the USIB take cognizance in their areas of responsibility of the USIB-developed Study and Plans in their further consideration and implementation of intelligence actions related to the developing situation in Vietnam.

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JOHN M. REYNOLDS
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chairman, CCPC

Attachments a/s

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TAB A

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Memorandum for Holders

USIB-D-64.6/47

18 February 1969

COPY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington 25, D. C.

20 December 1968

The Honorable W. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Your letter of 7 August 1968, jointly to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the Secretary of Defense, initiated a study on intelligence contingency planning for Vietnam under the conditions of a bombing halt or a cease fire.

The study and resultant plans are forwarded herewith. They provide a list of intelligence requirements, designate targets, catalogue collection systems (both operational and R&D) which can be tasked and indicate responsible authorities. The study and Plan A (Bombing Halt) were approved by the USIB on 31 October 1968 and have since been informally coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with the JCS. Plan B (Cease Fire) was approved by the USIB on 18 December 1968 and has been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for comment or recommendations. This Plan has been inserted in the attached document, but since it has not yet been fully coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be considered as tentative.

Plan A, as you will note, has actions specified which were required to take place before a bombing halt actually occurred. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities within Defense in mid-October and action was taken prior to the announcement of the bombing halt.

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Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-64.6/47
18 February 1969

I have a continuing concern with regard to the maintenance of our intelligence capability in Vietnam after the cease fire and in the post hostilities period. This capability will be important not only to our position in Vietnam but also to the support of U.S. policy throughout the area. I believe that the additional attention which has been given to the overall intelligence problem in Vietnam as a result of this study and planning effort has resulted in an improved collection against critical targets since the bombing halt and that there will be beneficial results in the ensuing critical period, both from the intelligence collection standpoint and through enabling a better understanding of the continuing intelligence need.

(Signed) Rufus Taylor
Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting Director

Attachment:
A/S

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Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-64.6/47

COPY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington 25, D. C.

17 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Planning for
the Vietnam Theater

REFERENCES : A. [] memo from Mr. Rostow 25X1
to DCI, August 7, 1968, same subject
B. [] letter from Acting DCI 25X1
to Mr. Rostow, 20 December 1968,
same subject

1. On 20 December, Admiral Taylor, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, forwarded to Walt Rostow a report on Vietnam Contingency Planning in response to Ref. A. In his transmittal letter (Ref. B.) Admiral Taylor pointed out that the Vietnam Contingency Study and Plan A (Bombing Halt) had been approved by the USIB and had been coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but that Plan B (Cease Fire), though passed by the USIB, was then being staffed by the Department of Defense so would have to be considered tentative.

2. Coordination on Plan B has now been completed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense without any recommendations for changes in the Plan being made. Therefore, Plan B, as included in Ref. A., is no longer tentative, and the whole document represents the final response to Mr. Rostow's request that intelligence contingency plans be developed.

3. One of the comments received from the Department of Defense, which I endorse, is that the Contingency Plan B should be accepted as useful guidance for intelligence activities in the event

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TAB B

Memorandum for Holders

USIB-D-64.6/47

of a cease fire and subsequent developments in Vietnam to include T-day and post-hostilities planning.

4. By separate action I am advising the intelligence community of the status of the completed study and plans, together with a request that they be given appropriate consideration in intelligence actions related to the developing situation in Vietnam.

(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director

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